The Aftermarket Performance of Initial Public Offerings:The Hong Kong Experience (2000-2004) by zhang, tang
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA  
 
FACULTY OF BUSINESS STUDIES 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tang Zhang  
 
The Aftermarket Performance of Initial Public Offerings: 
The Hong Kong Experience (2000-2004) 
 
 
 
Master‟s Thesis in 
                                             Accounting and Finance 
Line: Finance 
 
 
 
 
VAASA 2008 
1 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….7 
1.1 The research problem and hypotheses…………………………………...............9 
1.2 Reviews of previous study……………………………………………………...12 
1.3 Structure of the study……………………………………………………...........19 
 
2. MARKET EFFICIENCY THEOREM …………………………........20 
2.1 Perfect capital markets……………………………………………………20 
2.2 Random walk model……………………………………………………...21 
      2.3 Efficient market hypothesis and three forms of market efficiency………23 
2.4 Anomalies…………………………………………………………………26 
            2.4.1 Theoretical explanations of short-run underpricing anomalies……………27 
            2.4.2 Theoretical explanations of long-run underperformance anomalies………28 
     2.5 Behavioral finance………………………………………………………………..29 
 
3. DETERMINING THE VALUE OF A STOCK…………………...30 
3.1 Valuation models…………………………………………………………...30 
      3.2 Models for determining expected returns…………………………………..31 
      3.3 Price/Earnings-Ratio………………………………………………………….34 
      3.4 Pricing of initial public offerings…………………………………………..35 
 
4. HONG KONG EQUITY MARKETS……………………………..36 
4.1 Features of Hong Kong stock markets……………………………………...36 
      4.2 Advantages and disadvantages of going public……………………………..38 
      4.3 The process of public offering in Hong Kong stock markets……………….41 
            4.3.1 General……………………………………………………………...41 
            4.3.2 Requirements of public offering…………………………………44 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY………………..45 
     5.1 Data Description……………………………………………………………..45 
     5.2 Methodology…………………………………………………………………47 
            5.2.1 IPO initial raw returns ( )……………………………………………….47 
            5.2.2 Cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs)………...................................48 
            5.2.3 Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARs)………………………………..49 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS………………………………………………51 
       6.1 Initial performance of IPOs………………………………………………………51 
       6.2 The long term performance of IPOs……………………………………………55 
     6.3 The performance comparison between H-share IPOs and non H-share IPOs….58 
     6.4 The comparison of IPOs performance between high and low issue seasons…….61     
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION………………………………........65 
 
8. APPENDICES………………………………………………………….67 
 
9. REFERENCE…………………………………………………………..75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Business Studies 
Author:                                                      Tang Zhang  
Topic of the Thesis:                                  The Aftermarket Performance of Initial 
                                                                    Public Offerings: The Hong Kong 
                                                                    Experience (2000-2004) 
Name of the Supervisor:                          Timo Rothovius 
Degree:                                                       Master of Science in Economics and   
                                                                    Business Administration                                                                
Department:                                              Department of Accounting and Finance 
Major Subject:                                          Accounting and Finance 
Line:                                                           Finance 
Year of entering the University:              2006 
Year of completing the Thesis:                2008                                                Pages: 82 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigated the stock return performance of the initial public offering stocks 
which are listed on the main board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange during the years 2000 
to 2004. The results clearly show that Hong Kong main board IPOs are overpriced on 
average especially those IPOs in the years 2000 and 2001. This phenomenon may 
probably be explained by the collapse of the Dot-Com boom. Moreover, in the long term, 
the IPOs significantly underperformed the market in overall based on the CARs and 
BHARs methodologies.   
By splitting the samples based on the H-share IPOs and non H-share IPOs, the 
aftermarket performance is comparatively better in the H-share group than in the non H-
share group. This result may be derived from the stronger economic growth rate on the 
mainland China than in Hong Kong from the beginning of last decade of 20
th
 century. 
 
When investigating the aftermarket performance categorized by the year of issuance, we 
find poorer long term performance associated with the heavy volume of IPO in certain 
years and this result proves that the issuing firms are taking advantage of “windows of 
opportunity”. 
 
 
 
Key words: initial public offerings, overpricing, underperformance, H-share, CARs, 
BHARs 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) occurs when a private company sells stocks to the public 
for the first time. After the IPOs procedure the company‟s shares are listed on a stock 
exchange, such as Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE for short) and these shares can be 
bought and sold through the stock exchange. After going public, the listing companies are 
subject to the legal, regulatory and disclose requirements that lead to better corporate 
governance. IPOs are often issued by smaller and/or younger companies seeking capital 
to expand by selling ownership stakes to investors who believe in the company‟ future 
prospects. IPOs can also be issued by large privately-owned companies seeking to 
become publicly-traded firms. 
 
Many studies have examined the performance of new equity issues and there is an 
increase amount of literature for countries outside the U.S. A lot of evidences show that 
there exist two main IPO-related phenomena: the short-run underpricing phenomenon, 
and poor long term performance of IPOs. It is now widely accepted that the IPOs 
generate positive initial returns as reported in Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2006). Ritter 
& Welch (2002) systematically present the theoretical explanations of short-run 
underpricing. They classify the theories of underpricing based on whether asymmetric 
information or symmetric information between the IPO issuers and investors.  
 
Another interesting issue related to new equity issuing is the long-run underperformance 
of IPOs. According to Ritter (1991:4), several reasons explain why the long-run 
performance of initial public offerings is an intriguing research of area: First, from the 
investors‟ perspective, they could generate greater profits if they adopt the active trading 
strategies. Second, the nonzero aftermarket performance phenomenon conflicts the 
efficiency markets hypothesis (EMH) which indicate that nobody can achieve 
consistently huge returns to the risks in the securities markets (Kuppi & Martikainen 
1994:5). Third, the number of IPOs varies in the different years. This indicates that the 
issuers can take advantage of “windows of opportunities” by successfully timing new 
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issues if the poor long term performance is related to the high volume periods.  
 
The choices of the Hong Kong main board as the target for this research are because: 1) 
The capital market is mature and well regulated in Hong Kong (Carey & Steen 2006). It 
has been developed into an international financial and trade center with the greatest 
concentration of corporate headquarters in the Asia-Pacific region, for instance 70 of the 
world‟ top 100 banks are located in Hong Kong; 2) Lack of enough empirical studies on 
the IPO performance using the latest data on the main board of Hong Kong stock market 
given its size and importance of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE); 3) The strong 
economic growth of the mainland China from the beginning of last decade of 20
th
 century, 
more Chinese mainland enterprises have adopted the oversea IPO to attract the 
investment funds especially through the Hong Kong stock market. It is for these reasons 
that this study investigates the aftermarket performance of those IPO stocks compared to 
the overall performance of Hong Kong stock market and also those non China mainland 
companies.  
 
Figure 1 presents the comparison of annual GDP growth rate between mainland China 
and Hong Kong during the years 2000 and 2004. This table clearly shows the economic 
growth was significantly stronger on the mainland China than in Hong Kong from the 
year 2000. The table further illustrates that the dramatic decline of economic growth in 
Hong Kong after late of year 2000 was partially due to the collapse of the Dot-Com boom. 
This study also explores the effect of the collapse of the Dot-Com boom on the IPO stock 
performance after going public. This is one of the contributions of this paper to the IPO 
literature. The other contributions are: this paper provides the latest international 
evidence of IPOs performance using the updated data on the main board of Hong Kong; 
by splitting the sample into two groups: China enterprise and non China enterprise, this 
study explores the “China effect” on the performance of IPOs both in the short-run and 
long term.  
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Figure 1. The annual GDP Growth Rate of Mainland China and Hong Kong in the period 
of 2000 to 2004. (Source: IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS); the National 
Bureau of Statistics of China (PRC)) 
 
1.1 The research problem and hypothesis 
 
This paper sheds light on the stock return performance of the initial public offering stocks 
which are listed on the main board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) during the 
years 2000 to 2004. So this study provides one case of international evidence on both 
short-run and long term performance of initial public offerings. 
 
The first hypothesis of this study is related to the initial return of IPOs, which is defined 
as the return between the offering price and the first closing day price. Loughran et al. 
(2006) summarize the empirical results of the short-run performance with a sample of 39 
countries, and show that the short-run underpricing phenomenon prevails in all of the 39 
countries even though the amount of underpricing varies among countries. So we assume 
the first hypothesis is as following: 
 
        H1 : Initial public offerings are underpriced on the Hong Kong Main board 
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Even though the long term performance is a controversial topic in the literature of IPOs 
research (Ahmad-Zaluki, Campbell & Goodacre 2007), the long term underperformance 
prevails in many countries (see e.g. Ritter 1998). Ritter & Welch (2002) summarize the 
following several reasons why the IPO stocks are underperformed in the long-run: 
windows of opportunities; divergence of opinions; fads and over-optimism. So the second 
research purpose of this study is to test whether that the issuing firms during 2000-2004 
substantially underperformed the stock market in overall from the closing price on the 
first day of public trading to their three-year anniversaries. So the second hypothesis is as 
following: 
 
       H 2 : Post-IPO stocks underperform in the long-run on the Hong Kong Main Board 
 
In the previous section, the strong economic growth of mainland China during the sample 
period was mentioned and more Chinese mainland companies went to public through the 
Hong Kong stock market. IPO companies are separated into two groups: H share and 
non-H stocks. (According to the definition from Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing 
Limited (website: http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm):H-share companies are companies 
incorporated in the People's Republic of China and approved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission for a listing in Hong Kong. Shares in these companies are listed 
on the Stock Exchange, subscribed for and traded in Hong Kong dollars, or other 
currencies, and referred to as H shares. After finding its way into the Listing Rules, the 
term H share has been accepted and is widely used in the market. The letter H stands for 
Hong Kong).   
 
Figure 2 shows the comparison of the performance between the Hang Seng China 
Enterprise index (H-share index) and Hang Seng index in Hong Kong during the years 
2000 to 2007. (H-share index was launched in 1994 to track the performance of all the H-
shares of China enterprise, Hang Seng index a free-float capitalization-weighted index of 
selection of companies from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and it is the main 
indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong consisting 43 big companies. 
(http://www.hsi.com.hk/)). This graph clearly presents the overall performance of the H-
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share companies was better than the overall market in the most period of time. Those H-
share companies are registered on the mainland China and the main business of those 
companies is based in mainland China. So the two following hypothesis of this study 
expect the H-share companies perform better than non H-share companies both in the 
short-run and long term: 
 
   H 3 : The performance of average initial returns is better with H-share stocks than non 
H-share stocks 
 
   H 4 : The average long-run performance is better with H-share stocks than non H-share 
stocks 
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Figure 2. The comparison of performance between H-share index and Hang Seng index 
during the years 2000 to 2007. (Source: http://finance.yahoo.com) 
 
When the investors are especially optimistic about the growth potential of the companies 
going public, the issuing firms attempt to time their IPOs to take advantage of these 
swings in investor sentiment, so volume of IPOs varies in the different years. Several 
studies have already showed the poor long-run returns on IPOs are consistent with those 
issuers going public in the high volume period (see e.g. Ritter 1991, Loughran & Ritter 
1995). The next hypothesis of this study is: 
 
      H 5 : Low long-run return for the stocks issued in the high volume period of IPOs 
 
1.2 Reviews of previous studies 
 
A seminal article by Ibbotson (1975) reported a negative relation between initial returns 
of the IPOs and long-run share price performance for a sample of the U.S. IPOs issued 
during the period 1960-69. Ibbotson found that average returns for one month holding 
periods were positive in the first year after IPO, negative performance in the next three 
years and again positive performance in the fifth year. 
 
Ritter (1991), using a sample of 1,526 IPOs, that went public in the U.S. market in the 
1975-84 period, analyzed the price performance of returns from the first trading day to 
the third annual day with the matching non-issuers, found out after going public these 
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public firms significantly underperformed with a ratio of 0.83. And with the measure of 
cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) calculated with monthly portfolio 
rebalancing, where the adjusted returns are computed using several different benchmarks, 
he concluded the substantial variation in underperformance (see figure 3). He concluded 
that IPOs make bad medium- to long term investments. In his paper, he also argued that 
younger companies and going public in heavy volume years did even worse than average. 
This phenomenon can be explained as in the “hot issue” markets, IPO volume was one of 
the explaining variables for the pool performance and the young growth firms take 
advantage of these “window of opportunity”. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative average adjusted return for an equally-weight portfolio of 1,526 
initial public offerings in 1975-84, with monthly rebalancing. 
 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) confirmed the long term underperformance of IPOs with a 
sample from 1970-1990 and documented that during five years after the issue, investors 
have received average return of only 5 percent per year for companies going public 
compared the nonissuesers of the same size with a rate of 12 percent. Furthermore the 
evidence of this paper is consistent with a market where firms take advantage of window 
of opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, they are substantially overvalued. In 
addition, the underperforming varies over periods: the issuers that issue during a low-
activity offering period underperformance less than the ones who issue on the high-
activities offering period. 
 
Khurshed, Mudambi & Goergen (1999) explored the long term performance of IPO is a 
function of various pre-IPO factors; the manner in which a company operates before it is 
listed on the stock exchange gives a strong signal of how its shares will perform in its 
first few years after going to the public. Using the IPOs on the London Main Market from 
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1991 to 1995, they find the long term underperformance of 17.81% and that the 
percentage of equity issued and the degree of multinationality are critical predictors of 
IPO performance. 
 
Espenlaud, Gregory & Tonks (2000) re-examed the evidence on the long term abnormal 
performance of 588 IPOs in the UK from 1985-1997 under a number of alternative 
benchmarks and approached. They found that the long term underperformance over 3 
years irrespective of the benchmark used, however, over 5 years after the IPO crucially 
depend on the choice of technique and the statistical significance of underperformance is 
even less marked if these returns are measured in calendar time. 
 
Ritter & Welch (2002) reviewed the literature about the IPO issues, such as, issuing 
activity, underpricing, and long-run underperformance. They summarized the theory why 
firms choose to go public and the primary answer is “the desire to raise equity capital for 
the firm and to create a public market in which the founders and other shareholders can 
convert some of their wealth into cash at a future data. Non-financial reasons, such as 
increased publicity, play only a minor role for most firms: absent cash considerations, 
most entrepreneurs would rather just run their firms than concern themselves with the 
complex public market process”. And furthermore, they concluded several theories of the 
going public decision approach including life cycle theories, market-timing theories, and 
the changing composition of IPO issuers and so on. 
 
Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist (2006) summarized the updated international evidence of 
the equally-weighted average initial returns in a number of countries. The overall results 
in the table 1 show that underpricing phenomenon unanimously prevails in all 39 
countries. 
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Table 1. The international evidence of average initial returns for 39 countries. (Source: 
Loughran et al. 2006) 
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And from the last decade of 20
th
 century, more studies have provided international 
evidence on the long-run underperformance of IPOs which is consistent with what has 
been observed in the U.S. market. Drobetz, Kammermann & Wälchli (2005) investigated 
the Swiss IPO market by measuring the long term performance of Swiss IPO up to 120 
month after going public and found out the average market adjusted initial return is 
34.97%, however the long term underperformance tends to be significant only in the long 
run, i.e., after four year of secondary market trading and beyond. Other studies are: 
Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez (1993) for Latin America, Keloharju (1993) for Finland, 
Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) for Australia, Ljungqvist (1997) for Germany, Kooli & 
Suret (2003) for Canada report average market-adjusted losses of 47.0%, 8.1%, 46.5%, 
12.1% and 16.86%  respectively, by the third year anniversary of their first trade. These 
results show that long-run underperformance phenomenon is not only unique in the U.S. 
market. 
   
There are several papers examining IPO performance on the Hong Kong main board and 
growth enterprise markets (GEM). McGuinness (1992) investigated 980 IPOs in Hong 
Kong from 1980 and 1990 inclusively and found that most of the post-listing cumulative 
returns are contributed by the close of the first trading day. Dewenter & Field (2001) 
examined the infrastructure firm IPOs with relaxed listing requirement in the period from 
1996 to first half of 1997. They find that investment banks will avoid highly speculative 
issues in order to protect their reputations.  
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Cheng, Cheung & Po (2004) investigated the intra-day pattern of the 159 IPOs listed on 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong during the period of September 1995 and December 
1998. They indicate that the initial underpricing for the IPO firms is 12.3 percent and IPO 
underpricing occurs only at the pre-listing market and disappear afterward. 
 
Cheng, Cheung & Tse (2006) investigated the impact of the listing regulatory changes 
occurred in 1994 on the short-run and long term performance of IPOs on the main board 
of Hong Kong stock market. The results show that the IPOs significantly underperformed 
the market index over three years period based on the Buy-and-Hold strategy. The 
average market adjusted returns for one-year, two-year and three-year periods are -9.8%, 
-29.9% and -58.1% respectively and the average initial return is 19%. However, they find 
there are no significant changes of the performance of IPOs before and after the 
regulatory changes.  
 
Agarwal, Liu & Rhee (2006) tested the relationship between the pre-offering investors 
demand for the IPOs and the aftermarket performance. They find that the IPOs with high 
investor demand realize large positive initial returns but negative longer run excess 
returns, while the IPOs with low investor demand realize negative initial returns but 
perform relatively well in the longer run. They argue that this phenomenon can be 
explained by the speculative bubble hypothesis instead of information asymmetry 
hypothesis or the underpricing hypothesis.  
 
Carey & Steen (2006) investigated the initial returns of IPOs on the Hong Kong stock 
market during the years 1995 and 1999. They find the initial returns are relative with the 
market condition, and provide the evidence that during the “hot” market, the level of 
underpricing is significantly higher. But they did not find the association between H-share 
IPOs and IPO underpricing. 
 
Chan, Moshirian, Ng & Wu (2007) examined the stock return performance of IPOs listed 
on the growth enterprise market (GEM) in Hong Kong from 1999 to 2001. In the study, 
they find the initial return is 43 percent on average, however, in the long term, IPO stocks 
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are significantly underperformed based on the market index benchmark. During this 
period, “technology boom” emerged and they proved that this is the key factor affected 
the underperformance of GEM stocks. And they found that like the previous studies, the 
results are sensitive to the adoption of benchmarks and the methodologies. 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
 
The theoretical background for this study is provided in the next two chapters. In the 
chapter two, the market efficiency theorem is discussed and the two main phenomena, 
underpricing and underperformance, relative to initial pricing offering are also mentioned 
within this chapter. Chapter three contains the stock valuation and how to pricing the 
listing stocks. The overview feature of Hong Kong equity market is introduced in the 
chapter four including the advantages and disadvantages of going public and the process 
of public offering to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Chapter five presents the data used 
in this study and the methodology. Chapter six presents and analyzes the results. Finally 
chapter seven concludes this research and some ideas for the future research are also 
given in this chapter. 
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2. MARKET EFFICIENCY THEOREM 
 
In finance, the market efficiency theory is a central concept and it had been anticipated at 
the beginning of last century in the dissertation by Bachelier (1990) for his PHD in 
mathematics. And in his opening paragraph, he mentioned that “past, present, and even 
discounted future events are reflected in market price, but often show no apparent relation 
to price changes”. In order to comprehend this theory, it is necessary to look briefly the 
function of the capital markets. According to the definition by Copeland, Weston & 
Shastri (2005:353-354) the primary function of the capital markets is the transfer funds 
between lenders and borrowers efficiently. The existing capital markets allow companies, 
for example, to have better access to large investments by providing an opportunity to 
borrow money for their investments. For savers, the capital markets provide an 
environment to lend the needed money to the companies for getting higher return than 
they might otherwise earn. 
 
During this chapter about market efficiency theorem, the concept of perfect capital 
markets from the theoretical point of view will be described firstly. Then Random walk 
model and efficient market hypothesis will be introduced separately. After that, we will 
discuss about the anomalies, especially related to the IPO underpricing and 
underperformance anomalies. The last but not the least, behavioral finance, from the 
social science perspective including psychology and sociology (Shiller 2003) will be 
mentioned as another perspective to explain the IPO anomalies. 
 
2.1 Perfect capital markets 
With a better understanding of efficient markets, it would be better to correlate them with 
perfect capital markets. According to the finance theory, the perfect capital markets have 
to achieve four following terms (Copeland et al.2005: 353-354, Shapiro 1991): 
 
(1) There is no friction in markets. Thus, markets have no taxes, transaction costs or 
constraining legislation. Furthermore, the investment targets can be completely classified 
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and marked. 
 
(2) There is perfect competition in product and security markets. Every producer offers 
its products at minimum average costs in product markets and all the parties‟ trade at 
market price in security markets. 
 
(3) Markets are informationally efficient. The information is free and available to all 
parties simultaneously. All the market parties are harmonious in interpretation of the 
information. 
 
(4) All the investors rationally maximize their benefits. 
 
The perfect capital markets direct the funds efficiently. In markets like these all the 
information is reflected immediately into security prices and the saved funds are directed 
optimally to investments that the most profitable. However, all the assumptions presented 
above are theoretical and they do not appear in real markets, such as the positive 
information and trading costs existing in the real world. Nevertheless, the concept of ideal 
markets provides a satisfactory base to evaluate the efficiency of existing 
markets(Copeland et al. 2005: 353-354) and it is a clear benchmark to determine what are 
reasonable information and trading costs.(Fama 1970). 
 
2.2 Random walk-model 
 
In financial time series, Random walk (RW)-model is a model showing the movement of 
prices and consistent with the notion of market efficiency. And in the seminal research, 
French mathematician Louis Bachelier (1900) developed an elaborate mathematical 
theory of speculative prices and found the prices of French government bonds were 
consistent with the random walk model. And Mills (1999) systematically presents the 
following random walk-models: 
 
The most natural way to state formally the random walk model is as: 
22 
 
 
(1)                                           P t =P 1t +a t  
 
Where P t  is the price observed at the beginning of time t and a t  is an error term which 
has zero mean and whose values are independent of each other. The price change, ΔP t = 
P t - P 1t , is thus simply a t  and hence is independent of past price changes. And by 
successive backward substitution in (1), it can be written as the current price as the 
accumulation of all past errors, i.e. 
 
(2)                                         P t =
t
t t
a
1
 
 
So that the random walk model implies that prices are indeed generated by cumulating of 
pure random changes. 
 
Furthermore, there are several theories concerning the random walk-model. The basic 
model, fair game, meaning that, across the large sample, the expected return on an asset 
equals its actually return on average. (Copeland et al. 2005: 367-368). Martingale is a 
stochastic process that is the mathematical model of a fair game. The mathematics model 
is: 
 
(3)                                    E(X t -X s ｜ξ t ) =0 
 
Whenever s≤t, ξ t  is the σ-algebra comprising events determined by observations over 
the intervals [0, t]. 
Submartingale is a fair game where tomorrow‟ price is expected to be higher than today‟s 
price. Thus, the expected returns are positive. Written as: 
 
(4)                                   E(X t -X s ｜ξ t ) ≥0, s≤t 
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And to the case where the above inequality is reversed, giving as a supermartingale. 
(Copeland et al. 2005: 367-368) 
 
2.3 Efficient market hypothesis and three forms of market efficiency 
 
 
An efficient capital market is one in which stock prices fully reflect available information. 
The efficient-market hypothesis (EMH) has implication for investors and for firms. (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe 2002:342) 
 
(1) Because information is reflected in prices immediately, investors should only expect 
to obtain a normal rate of return. Awareness of information when it is released does an 
investor no good. The price adjusts before the investor has time to trade on it. 
 
(2) Firms should expect to receive the fair value for securities that they sell. Fair means 
that the price they receive for the securities they issue is the present value. Thus, valuable 
financing opportunities that arise from fooling investors are unavailable in efficient 
capital markets. 
 
Fama (1970) defined the efficient market and put it into a simple way. He defines the 
market is efficient : a) if all security prices fully reflect all know market information and 
b) no traders in the market have monopoly control of information. Then Fama (1970) 
classified the well known three levels of market efficiency in his study. Three forms of 
market efficiency are described briefly according to the level of information reflected in 
the security prices: 
 
(i) Weak-form efficiency: if the stock prices already reflect all information that 
can be derived by examining market trading data such as the history of past 
prices, trading volumes, or short interest. And weak-form efficiency is 
presented mathematically as: 
 
(5) = + Expected return +  
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This equation states that the price today is equal to the sum of the last observed price plus 
the expected return on the stock plus a random component occurring over the interval. 
The expected return is a function of a security‟ risk and would be based on the models of 
risk and return. The random component is due to new information on the stock and it 
could be either positive or negative and has an expectation of zero. 
 
(ii) Semistrong-from efficiency: if the prices reflect (incorporate) all publicly 
available information, including information such as published accounting 
statements for the firm as well as historical price information. 
 
(iii) Strong-form efficiency: if prices reflect all information, even including 
information available only to company insiders. (Ross et al. 2002:341-347; 
Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2005:373) 
 
The information set of past prices is a subset of the information set of public set of 
publicly available information, which in turn is a subset of all information. The 
relationship among the three different information set is showed in the figure 4. 
Semistrong-from efficiency implied weak-from efficiency and strong-from efficiency 
implies semistong-from efficiency. (Ross et al, 2002:346). 
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Figure 4. Relationship among Three Different Information Sets. (Source: Ross et al. 
2002) 
 
According to the previous research, Fama (1991) reinterpreted the market efficient 
hypothesis. The table 2 shows the comparison between the old classification and the new 
version. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of market hypothesis categories. 
 
Fame (1970)                                         Fama (1991) 
Weak-form test                                 Test for return predictability 
Semi-strong form test                       Event study 
Strong-form test                                Test for private information 
 
 
In this study (Fama 1991), he pointed out that event study is the cleanest method to test 
the market efficiency and event study can provide quite clear picture to present the speed 
All information 
relevant to a stock
Information of 
publicly available 
information
Information set of 
past prices
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of adjustment of securities prices to information. Furthermore, he concluded that the 
prices adjust efficiently to the firm-specific information. Referring to the test for private 
information, “the investors studied in most detail for private information are pension fund 
and mutual fund managers”. But the test about whether the investor managers have 
access to the private information will meet the joint-hypothesis problem: “measured 
abnormal returns can result from market inefficiency, a bad model of market equilibrium, 
or problems in the way the model is implemented”. And he concluded that the 
professional managers actually have rare private information because the rise of passive 
investment strategies. Return predictability is the controversial part in the market 
efficiency theory. Recent studies “on the predictability of long-horizon stock returns from 
past returns is high on drama but short on precision”. Furthermore, depending on other 
variables, such as dividend yields, P/E ration, term spread and so on, predictability of 
returns is more reliable. 
 
2.4 Anomalies 
 
In the last section, we discussed about the market efficiency, but in the real world, we 
have observed some phenomenon contradicting the efficient market hypothesis, such as 
Small-Firm-in-January, P/E effect, Book-to-Market Ratios, The Weekend effect, Holiday 
effects and so on. In finance, these are referred to as effect market anomalies. Thaler 
(1987) explained these price behaviors from the perspective of institutional consideration, 
and those are A) the custom of buy-sell stocks coincides with calendar changes, so the 
prices may be influenced by the inflow and outflow of funds in the market. B) “Window 
dressing” refers to the institutional investors clean up their portfolios before the reporting 
dates and these coincide with national calendar dates. C) “Systematic timing of the arrival 
of good and bad news”. However, recent research focus on the explanations related to the 
behavioral factors, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
In the following paragraphs, the IPO anomalies, mainly the underpricing of short-run and 
the underperformance of long term will be reviewed. 
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2.4.1 Theoretical explanations of short-run underpricing anomalies 
 
Ritter & Welch (2002) summarize this issue into two basic explanations: theories based 
on asymmetric information and symmetric information. 
 
In the theories based on asymmetric information, they classified into two situations: 1) if 
issuer is more informed than investors. Under this situation, the high quality issuers 
attempt to signal their high quality by deliberate selling their shares at a lower price than 
the market believes they are worth to distinguish them from the pool of low-quality 
issuers. However, those issuing companies tend to underpricing IPOs and leave money on 
the table to create “a good taste in investors‟ mouths.”  This is because firms would get 
compensation in the future issuing. 2) If investors are more informed than the issuer. A 
number of researches have investigated this situation. And the realistic assumption is the 
investors are differentially informed. Rock (1986) pointed out the winner‟ curse theory, 
which indicates uninformed investors fear that they will receive a full allocation of 
overpricing IPOs and get comparative lower returns. Faced with the adverse selection, 
then those investors tend to summit purchase orders only if IPOs are underpriced 
sufficiently compensate them for the bias in  the allocation of new issues. The another 
result of pricing too high is a negative cascade (Welch 1992), in this theory, the investors 
just request the shares when the offering is hot and the investors‟ behaviors will be 
influenced by other investors, so the issuers have to price the IPO a little lower to make 
the IPOs oversubscribed. Baron (1982) and Habib & Ljungqvist (2001) offer a different 
explanation for underpricing from the cost perspective, meaning the underpricing is a 
necessary cost of going public and also a substitution for expenditure of marketing 
promotion.  
 
Ritter & Welch (2002) argue that “all theories of underpricing based on asymmetric 
information share the prediction that underpricing is positively related to the degree of 
asymmetric information. When the asymmetric information uncertainty approaches zero 
in these models, underpricing disappears entirely”. 
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In the theories based on symmetric information, two main theories of underpricing exist. 
One is the law-avoidance explanation, meaning that issuers underprice to reduce their 
legal liability (Tinic 1988). Another is related to the trading volume in the aftermarket, 
Boehmer & Fishe (2000) pointed out that trading volume in the aftermarket is higher; the 
greater is underpricing and then the underwriter gains additional trading revenue. 
 
2.4.2 Theoretical explanations of long-run underperformance anomalies 
 
Based on the study (Ibbotson & Ritter 1995), there are several explanations related to the 
phenomenon of the long term underperformance of IPOs: 1) The divergence of opinion 
hypothesis. This theory was first proposed by Miller (1977), he states that investors have 
heterogeneous briefs about the value of an IPO firm and the most optimistic investors 
will be the buyers. Over time, as more information is released, the variance of opinions 
between optimistic and pessimistic investors decrease, and nationally the price will fall. 
In the following research (Jain & Kini (1994), Field & Hanka (2001) and Brav & 
Gompers (2002)), they proved this theory exhibit in different countries. 2) The windows 
of opportunity hypothesis. Ritter (1998) offers that “ if there are periods when investors 
are especially optimistic about the growth potential of companies going public, the large 
cycles in volume may represent a response by firms attempting to „time‟ their IPOs to 
take advantage of these swings in investor sentiment. ” Ritter (1991) also mentioned that 
the issuers take advantage of “windows of opportunity” in certain years, however, 
“younger companies and companies going public in heavy volume years did worse than 
average”. Loughran & Ritter (1995) prove evidence that issuers take advantage of 
“windows of opportunity” where investors are irrational overoptimistic about the value of 
IPO firms, and related to the low long run performance. Other explanations are including 
Teoh, Welch & Wong (1998), they pointed out that the low long run performance is 
related to optimistic accounting early in the life of the firm to induce investors to buy the 
shares; Heaton (2001), he related the poor long run return with the overoptimistic 
sentiment of the managers and they tend to overinvest if the funds are available. 
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2.5 Behavioral finance 
 
In the last section, we discussed the theories of anomalies and several explanations for 
these phenomena. Furthermore, we try to exploit them from another perspective-
behavioral finance. 
 
Behavioral finance has been a hot topic since a couple decades ago and is the most 
controversial area in finance (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993). Shefrin (2002) briefly define 
the behavioral finance, he offers “Behavioral finance is the application of psychology to 
financial behavior-the behavior of practitioners” and categorized three themes of 
behavior finance: “Heuristic-Driven Bias”, “Frame Dependence” and “Inefficient 
Market”. These themes are consistent with the Ritter (2003), he argued that there are two 
building blocks in behavioral finance, one is cognitive psychology (how people think) 
and another is the limits to arbitrage (when markets will be inefficient). In the cognitive 
psychology, several human behavior patterns in finance are considered: such as, 
Heuristics, or rules of thumb, people follow this to make investments easier but this 
process usually leads to other errors; Overconfidence; Framing, “the notion that how a 
concept is presented to individual matters”; Representativeness, this principle was firstly 
proposed by Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky (1972) and refers to “judgments based 
on stereotype” (Shefrin 2002)); Mental Accounting, “people sometimes separate 
decisions that should, in principle, be combined.” (Ritter 2003); Conservatism, or 
Anchoring-and-Adjustment, meaning that people stick to the ways things have normally 
been and may underact when changes happen. 
 
Regarding to the initial public offerings (IPOs), there are three behavior phenomena 
related: (1) initial underpring, (2) long term underperformance, (3) “hot –issue” market. 
Shefrin (2002) argued that these three “are indicative of inefficient markets, largely 
stemming from heuristic-driven bias.” And “frame dependence also plays key roles in 
explaining the three phenomena.” 
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3. DTERMINING THE VALUE OF A STOCK 
 
3.1 Valuation models 
 
In finance theory, the value of stock is determined by the present value of its future cash 
flows. (Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe 2002). And two kinds of cash flows are provided by the 
stock: 1) most stocks pay dividends on a regular basis. 2) sell price when the investors 
sell out the stocks. The general model of the value of the stock is presented as: 
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Div t  is the dividend paid at t year‟ end, P 0  is the present value of the common stock 
investment. r is the discount rate of the stock and is greater than the interest rate in the 
case where the stock is risky. 
 
In practice, the level of expected dividend is growing, fluctuating, or constant. And the 
general model can be simplified if the firm‟ dividends are expected to follow some basic 
patterns: (1) zero growth (2) constant growth (3) differential growth. The summary of 
dividend-growth models is following: (g is the growth rate.) 
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3.2 Models for determining expected returns 
 
During this section, we will focus on three classic models to determine the expected 
returns. In the theory of finance, the expected return is the return the investors expect a 
stock to earn over the next period. And this is just an expectation; the actual return may 
be either higher or lower (Ross, Westerfield & Jaffe 2002). The three models, CAPM 
(Capital-Asset-Pricing-Model), APT (Arbitrage pricing Model) and Fama-French three-
factor model, will be presented in this section. 
 
3.2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
 
Based on the model of portfolio choice proposed by Harry Markowitz (1959), William 
Sharp (1964) and John Lintner (1965) developed the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
which marks the birth of asset pricing theory (Fama & French 2004). 
 
The basic theory of the familiar Sharp-Lintner CAPM equation when considering about 
the risk free borrowing and lending is the expected return on any asset i is the risk-free 
interest rate R f , plus a risk premium, which is the asset‟ market beta, ß iM , times the 
premium per unit of beta risk, E(R
M
)- R f . The formula is following: 
 
(10)                E(R i ) = R f + ß iM *[E(R M ) - R f ], i=1, 2…N 
 
In this equation, E(R i ) is the expected return on asset i, and ß iM , the market beta of asset 
i, is the covariance of its return with the market return divided by the variance of the 
market return, 
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Fama & French (2004) argued that although more than 40 years passed, the CAPM is still 
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widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of capital for firms and evaluating 
the performance of managed portfolios. And the main reason of the popularity is because 
“it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and the 
relation between expected return and risk.” However, the empirical record of the model is 
not good, and it cannot be used in application. And many studies have already showed 
there are many stock returns patterns cannot be explained by the CAPM, such as the 
stock return is related to its size (ME, the ratio of the book value of common equity to its 
market value), earnings/price (E/P), cash flow/price (C/P), and past sales growth. (Banz 
(1978), Reinganum (1980), Rosenberg, Reid & Lanstein (1985), and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1994)). These patterns are typically called anomalies. Ross (1976) 
proposed the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) is an alternative to the simple one-factor 
CAPM. 
 
3.2.2 Arbitrage pricing theory (APT) 
 
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) developed primarily by Ross (1976) is a parametric 
alternative to the simple one-factor CAPM and to some extent APT accounts for the 
empirical anomalies that arise within the CAMPM. It is a one-period model in which the 
investors believe that the stochastic properties of return of the capital assets are consistent 
with a factor structure. And this theory is based on three assumptions (Reinganum 1981). 
First, the capital markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, investors always prefer 
more wealth to less wealth with certainty. And thirdly, the stochastic process generating 
asset returns can be represented as a k-factor model, the form is following: 
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Where: 
iR
~
= return on asset i; 
E i =expected return for asset i; 
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b ik = reaction in asset i‟s return to movements in the common factor k
~
 
k
~
= a common factor, with a zero mean, that influences the return on all assets; 
i
~
= an idiosyncratic effect on asset i‟s return which, by assumption, is completely 
diversifiable in large portfolios and has a mean of zero; 
N= number of assets. 
 
Reinganum (1981) argued that “the economic argument of the APT is a simple one. In 
equilibrium, the return on a zero-investment, zero-systematic-risk portfolio is zero, as 
long as the idiosyncratic effects vanish in a large portfolio”. 
 
3.2.3 Fama-French three-factor model 
 
Fama & French (1993, 1996) proposed a three-factor model for expected returns based on 
the firm characteristics. And this formula is following: 
 
(13)        E(R i )-R f =b i [E(R M )-R f ]+s i E(SMB)+h i E(HML), 
In this model, the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [E(R i )-R f ] 
is explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (і) the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio (E(R M )-R f ); (іі) the difference between the return on a portfolio of 
small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SME, small minus big); and (ііі) 
the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the 
return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low), and b i ,s i ,h i
are the factor sensitivities. 
 
And one application of the expected return equation of the three-factor model is that the 
intercept i  in the time-series regression, (Fama & French 2004) 
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(14)     R it -R ft = i + iM (R Mt -R ft ) + is SMH i + ih HML i +ε it  
 
is zero for all assets i. And according to Fama & French (1993,1996), the three factor 
model captures much of the variation in average return for portfolios formed on size, 
book-to-market equity and other prices ratios that cause problems for the CAPM. 
 
Fama & French (2004) offers that the three factor model is now widely used in the 
empirical research work which requires a model of expected returns. The main 
applications are: the estimation of i  is used to calculate the speed about the stock prices 
responding to new information; the measurement of the fund performance; an alternative 
way to estimate the cost of equity capital. 
 
3.3 Price/Earnings-Ratio 
 
In academic and practitioner publication, the price-earnings multiple, the ratio of price 
per share to earnings per share (P/E ratio), is broadly used for evaluating the IPO stock by 
comparing the comparable company‟ P/E ratio. The P/E ratio reflects the market‟ opinion 
of a firm‟ potential growth opportunity. The P/E ratio can e.g. be obtained as following: 
(Bodie et al. 2005:624) 
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Where  = share price, =earnings, b=percentage of the earnings that are reinvested 
into the company, r=required rate of return, ROE= return on equity. 
 
From this formula, we can find P/E ratio increases with ROE increases. This is because 
higher ROE projects give the company good opportunities for growth and if the 
companies take advantage of these opportunities the market will reward the company 
with high P/E ratio. However, Bodie et al. (2005) also mentioned two main pitfalls in the 
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P/E analysis: 1) The accounting earnings in the denominator of the equation (15) are 
affected by different accounting rules and valuation methods. 2) The use of P/E ratio is 
related to the business cycle. And P/E ratio in the equation (15) assumes implicitly that 
earnings rise at a constant rate, however, the reported earnings can fluctuate dramatically 
around a trend line. Kim & Ritter (1999) found that using P/E to valuate the IPO stocks 
based on the historical earnings leads to less accurate valuation results compared to that 
based on the forecasted earnings. 
 
3.4 Pricing of initial public offerings 
 
Establishing a reasonable offering price for the IPO firms is the critical part. However, 
pricing of IPO is very difficult and so many factors will influence the IPO valuation. Kim 
& Ritter (1999) mentioned that the first step of pricing the IPO stock is to compare its 
financial and operational performance with that of a number of public companies in the 
same industrial sector. As the underwriters, the investments must set the minimum and 
maximum offering prices according to the market price ratios and the adjustment of the 
firm-specific information. The price range should balance the conflicting goals of the 
most important parties: issuers and investors. For issuers, they want the highest price to 
take full advantages to raise more capitals. But if the stock is overpriced, the risk of a 
poor after-market performance is increasing and might lead the lawsuits from the 
investors and also investors will reject the next offering. However, on another side, the 
investors are willing to pay the lowest price. Underpricing makes the company “leave 
something on the table” and also damages the investment banker‟ reputation. The 
investment bankers not only need to consider about the internal factors: an issuer‟s 
historical and projected financial results for pricing of IPOs, but also the valuation for 
comparable companies and the overall market condition, and the most important factor: 
the investor‟ demand for the new issue. 
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4. HONG KONG EQUITY MARKET 
 
In this chapter, Hong Kong equity markets and the institutional environment will be 
briefly introduced. Understanding the features of Hong Kong stock markets would help 
us explain the quantitative results from the empirical study better. The process of public 
offering, especially from the Hong Kong equity markets perspective will be mentioned 
including the requirements of public offering. Advantages and disadvantages of public 
offering will be discussed after that. 
 
4.1 Features of Hong Kong stock markets 
 
Hong Kong, officially the Hong Kong special administration region of the people‟s 
republic of China, is one of the two special administration regions. As a gateway to 
mainland China, she closely links to the mainland China. However, Hong Kong 
maintains a highly capitalist economy built on a policy of free market, low taxation and 
government non-intervention. Furthermore, Hong Kong has been developed into an 
international financial center and trade, with the greatest concentration of corporate 
headquarters in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) was established in 1891. The exchange has 
predominantly been the main exchange for Hong Kong where shares of listed companies 
are traded. Right now Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing is the holding company for 
the exchange, And so far Hong Kong Stock Exchange ranks fifth in the world by market 
capitalization of listed companies, with a total market capitalization of over Hong Kong 
US$ 19.904 trillion at the end September of 2007. (HKSE Statistics 2007, website: 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm). 
 
According to the Handbook (Listing in Hong Kong: A quality market, 2007) published 
by HKSE, some of Hong Kong‟s advantages as a listing venue are set out below: 
 
37 
 
(1) Gateway to mainland China 
 
With close trading and business links to the Mainland China, Hong Kong is strategically 
placed in a high growth region and provides an ideal platform for issuers to achieve 
exposure in the rapidly growing Mainland market. As an internationally recognized 
financial centre with an abundance of professional China expertise, the Exchange has 
provided many Asian and multinational companies a gateway to the Mainland China. 
 
(2) Home market for mainland companies 
 
As Hong Kong is one of the top 10 largest stock markets in the world and part of 
Mainland China, the market is the first choice for Mainland companies seeking a listing 
on an overseas international market. The applicability of the “home market” theory is 
reinforced by the statistic that a significant portion of the trading value of Mainland 
companies is conducted in Hong Kong where such companies have a dual listing in Hong 
Kong and another major overseas exchange. 
 
(3)  Strong investor demand and fund raising capability 
 
Hong Kong has the ability to attract an impressive investor base from both local and 
overseas investment communities. This provides issuers a platform with strong fund 
raising capability during their initial public offerings and post-listing fund raising 
activities. 
 
(4) Free flow of capital and information 
 
With zero capital flow restriction, simple tax structure, free convertibility of currency and 
free flow of information, Hong Kong offers an attractive market for both issuers and 
investors alike. 
 
(5) Strong legal system and international accounting standards 
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Hong Kong has a well established legal system based on English common law and adopts 
Hong Kong or International Financial Reporting Standards, which provides a strong and 
attractive foundation for companies to raise funds as well as confidence to investors. 
 
(6) Sound regulatory framework 
 
The Exchange‟s Listing Rules are on a par with international standards and demand from 
listed issuers a high level of disclosure. The Exchange‟s stringent corporate governance 
requirements ensure that investors have access to timely and transparent information 
which allows them to appraise the position and prospects of the companies. 
 
(7) Advanced trading, clearing and settlement Infrastructure 
 
Hong Kong possesses a strong trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure of the 
securities market which facilitates greater liquidity of the stock market and provides 
quality services to brokers, investors and other market participants. 
 
4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of going public 
 
Initial price offering provides an alternative way to raise the huge number of fund for the 
company to support the continuous operation, strengthen the market shares and customer 
relationship, and increase the R&D spending in order to find new products or new use of 
the existing products, and after that to increase the manufacturing capacity to make the 
products and then distribute those products. (Ross 2003). And in this section, additional 
advantages as well as some disadvantages will be discussed separately. 
 
4.2.1 Advantages of going public 
 
Referring to the Handbook (Listing in Hong Kong: A quality market) published by HKSE 
and Ross (2003), there are several benefits for the issuing companies. 
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(1) Liquidity and valuation 
 
On the public markets, the shareholders can trade the shares of the listing companies, so 
the investors are willing to pay a premium for liquidity. And the information  contained 
in the subsequent public financial reports reduce the uncertainty around the performance, 
so compared to the private company, the identical company exist higher value 
approximately 30 %. 
 
(2) Management and employee motivation 
 
The grant of employee share options or stock bonuses to attract and tie the management 
and employee is becoming more and more popular since 1990. And the equity-based 
awards and ownership is more popularly used in the public companies compared to the 
private companies, and the holders can easily find the results directly from the stock 
prices changes. 
 
(3) Higher profile and enhanced images 
 
One of the intangible benefits of going public is the increased visibility of the company 
through its ongoing disclosures to the stock exchange or security commissions. And this 
higher profile in the market will generate reassurance among the companies‟ customers 
and suppliers and finally enhance the company images. 
 
(4) Increased the corporate transparency 
 
This benefit is related to the previous advantage, and the increased company transparency 
could lead to the grant of credits lines on more competitive terms from the company‟ 
bankers. 
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4.2.2 Disadvantages of going public 
 
Going public have several disadvantages, and in the following section, some main 
disadvantages of initial price offering will summarized according to the literature.(Sabine 
1987:43-44); Ritter (1998:1); Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter (1988:37) and Benton (2005). 
 
(1) Time and Costs of IPO 
 
The IPO offering process is time consuming, distracting and expensive. Normally, the 
actual IPO offering process takes about five to six month, even one year to complete. The 
cost of IPO offering includes the underwriter fees, the listing fees, the legal fees, 
accounting fees and miscellaneous fees. For instance, the appendix 1 and 2 show the 
initial listing fees and the annual listing fees on the main board of Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange separately. According to the Handbook, the initial listing fees are calculated 
based on the monetary value of equity securities of the company to be listed and the 
annual listing fee which is calculated by reference to the nominal value of the securities 
which are or are to be listed on the Exchange. And as mentioned before, the offering 
price is usually underpricing, so the dilution of share price is also an indirect cost. 
 
(2) Public companies face ever increasing discloses requirements. 
 
Once going public, the public company is required to disclose a number of information 
about the business strategy, financial and accounting information and some degrees of 
prospective analysis and so on. At the same time, the companies have to be cautious on 
the timing of releasing these reports which can hurt the stock prices. 
 
(3) Loss of founders‟ control and reduce the operation flexibility. 
 
The founders may lose the control power within the IPO and shareholders have more 
rights to decide the business strategy. Furthermore, the need of approval by shareholders 
will slow down the decision-making processes and make the company lose the business 
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opportunities especially face the fast changing business environment. 
 
(4) Expectations of the short term results. 
 
Analyst and shareholders, especially the individual investors, they monitor the short term 
performance of the company closely, like quarterly even daily. So if the company‟ long 
term planning hurts the short term performance, which will influence the sentiment of the 
investors, then eventually affects the stock prices. 
 
4.3 The process of public offering in Hong Kong stock markets 
 
4.3.1 General 
 
The procedure for issuing IPOs and listing on the main board of Hong Kong Stock 
Market is similar to that of many British Commonwealth countries. Issues are normally 
underwritten and fixed pricing is adopted as opposed to a book building approach. (Carey 
& Steen 2006). 
 
This section outlines the main process by which companies are brought to market in an 
initial offering pricing on the main board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange and some 
specific issues to which we need to pay more attention. And according to Ross et al. 
(2002), Ellis, Michaely & O‟Hara (1999), Handbook by Herbert Smith (2006) and 
Handbook: Listing in Hong Kong (HKSE 2007), I summarized the steps required to IPO 
and the related issues. 
 
The first step in the issue of securities to the public is to obtain the approval from the 
board of directors within the company. Then the company needs to select an investment 
bank to advise it and perform underwriting functions or public offerings can be managed 
by several underwriters and one investment bank is selected as the lead manager. And the 
lead manager plays the major role through the transaction and this type is most common 
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in the real world. The most commonly used listing method in Hong Kong is an offer for 
subscription, which is the offer of new securities to the public by the issuer, or by 
someone on behalf of the issuer. (Cheng, Cheung & Po 2004). Through the contract 
between the issuer and the underwriters, the role of underwriters can be determined and 
the underwriters guarantee the issue. The most common type of underwriting 
arrangement involved with large issues is “firm commitment” underwriting, which means 
the underwriters subscribes themselves the securities to sell them again to the investors. 
Once the underwriters have been selected, the main following steps are shown in the 
figure 5, indicating the listing flowchart to the main board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
From this chart, we can find out the process of initial pricing offering is complex and 
combined of tasks by a number of participants. “The completion of the process provides 
new capital for the firm and a new investment opportunity for the public.” (Ellis et al. 
1999) 
 
Following the British company law, the subscribers for IPOs on the main board of Hong 
Kong stock market are invited to apply for shares when the offer period and the offer 
price are published in a prospectus and also pay in advance for shares sought in a new 
issue before they know whether or not they would receive an allocation. And issuing 
firms and underwriters distribute shares randomly and equally across application orders. 
So it is uncertain for the applicants to be allocated all the shares they applied for. This 
means that IPO applicants would face the loss of the opportunity cost of interest income 
from the application funds. (Leung & Menyah 2006).  
 
If the offer is over-subscribed, the underwriter will be responsible for the share allocation. 
The HKSE must be satisfied that the share allotment procedure is fair so that applications 
for the same number of securities receive equal treatment. The share allotment result is 
published in the newspaper and trading in the shares of the newly listed companies will 
start on the HKSE shortly afterwards. (Cheng et al. 2004) 
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Figure 5. Listing Flowchart for the main board of HKSE. 
(Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange, website: http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm) 
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4.3.2 Requirements of public offering 
 
This section will delineate three main listing requirements of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
according to the Handbook: Listing in Hong Kong (HKSE 2007). 
 
(1) Financial requirement: new applicants must fulfill one of three financial criteria 
showed in the appendix 3. 
 
(2) Management, ownership and control during the track record period: A new applicant 
must have been under substantially the same management and ownership during the 3-
year track record period. In practice, this means that the company has had: 
 
a. Management continuity for at least the 3 preceding years; 
 
b. Ownership continuity and control for at least the most recent audited financial 
year. 
 
(3) Spread of shareholders: 
 
a. A minimum of 300 holders (if qualifying under the profit test or market 
capitalization/revenue/cash flow test) or 1,000 holders (if qualifying under the 
market capitalisation/revenue test) 
 
b. Not more than 50% of the securities in public hands at the time of listing can be 
beneficially owned by the 3 largest public shareholders. 
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5. DATE DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In this chapter, the data and the methodology used in this study will be introduced. The 
main objective of this chapter is to explain why and how the abnormal returns are 
measured by the different approaches. 
 
5.1 Data Description 
 
Data used for the calculation of initial returns performance and long term performance of 
IPOs is described in this section. The sample for calculating the initial returns includes 
176 IPO companies during the years 2000 to 2004. And sample for calculating the long 
term performance is comprised of 188 initial public offerings during the same sample 
period. The sample number for calculation the initial returns is less than that for the 
calculation of long term performance is because: some IPO companies are upgraded from 
GEM (Hong Kong Growth Enterprise Market, the secondary board of Hong Kong Stock 
Market; website: http://www.hkgem.com) to the main board of Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, therefore there are no offering price for those companies. 
 
The sample for the calculation of the long term performance includes 188 initial public 
offerings in 2000-2004, and represented 82.1% of the total number of the firms going 
public and 98.18% of the total amount of new equity raised in those years. Data on the 
issuing details is obtained from the website of HKSE; stock returns of each IPO 
companies and the market index returns come from two sources: Thompson Financial 
Services (DataStream) and Yahoo Finance. A total of 41 IPOs were excluded from the 
sample because of either: (i) being delisted due to mergers or acquisitions during the 
sample period. (ii) being bankrupt during the 36 months aftermarket. (iii) missing data 
from the Database for up to three years after listing. Table 3 presents the distribution of 
the sample for the long term performance calculation by year, both in terms of the 
number of offers and the gross proceeds. Inspection of table 3 shows that the number and 
the capitalization raised of IPOs were not evenly distributed over the 2000-20004 sample 
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period. Only 21 of the 188 sample offers occurred during the year 2001. However, the 
number of IPOs in year 2002 is twice than that in 2001. The overall real gross proceeds 
raised by the 188 IPOs over the period time were approximately 329,773 Million Hong 
Kong Dollars. And thirty-five percent (HK$ 115,766 million of the HK$ 329,773 million 
total) of the aggregate gross proceeds in the sample was raised in 2000 alone.  
 
Figure 6 describes the number of the H-share IPOs and non H-share IPOs in the sample 
period for the long term performance calculation. During the five-year period, 27 H-share 
IPOs were listed on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. This number is 
same for both short-run performance and long term performance calculation. And in the 
second half of the sample period, more Chinese mainland enterprises have chosen Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange as the target oversea public market. 
 
The Hang Seng index is chosen as the market benchmark in this study. And it is a free-
float capitalization-weighted index of selection of companies from the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong, and it is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong 
consisting 43 big companies. (http://www.hsi.com.hk/). 
 
Table 3. Distribution of Initial Public Offering (for long term performance calculation) by 
Year, 2000-2004. 
 
  Total of 229 
offers 
  188 offers in 
sample 
  Total 
included 
Year No. 
of 
IPOs 
Aggregate 
gross 
proceeds 
HK$ Millions 
 No.of 
IPOs 
Aggregate 
gross 
proceeds 
HK$ Millions 
 No.of 
IPOs 
(%) 
Aggregate 
gross 
proceeds 
(%) 
 
2000 43 117,407.00  30 115,766.00  69.77 98.60 
2001 31 21,599.00  21 19,986.00  67.74 92.53 
2002 60 45,185.00  51 44,316.00  85.00 98.08 
2003 46 57,226.00  43 57,141.00  93.48 99.85 
2004 49 94,465.00  43 92,564.00  87.76 97.99 
         
Total 229 335,882.00  188 329,773.00  82.10 98.18 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Initial Public Offering in the sample for two groups: H-share 
IPOs and non H-share IPOs, 2000-2004. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
 
The approaches to investigate the aftermarket performance of initial offering returns are 
mainly followed with the methodology used in the papers Agarwal, Liu & Rhee (2006), 
Ritter (1991), Levis (1993) and Chan et al (2007). Following the previous research, the 
returns are calculated for two intervals: 1) The initial return period, covers the first day of 
trading, i.e., it related the first closing price to the offering price of an issue. 2) After 
market period, defined as the 3 years after the IPO exclusive of the initial return period. 
The initial return period is defined to be month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the 
following 36 months where event months are defined as successive 21-trading-day 
periods relative to the IPO date. 
 
5.2.1 IPO initial raw returns (IRi) 
 
In order to measure the initial returns on the first trading day, the following formula to 
calculate the initial raw returns is used: 
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      (16)                                           =   
 
Where, for IPO firm i,  is the closing price on the first trading day and is the 
subscription price. If the result from the equation (16) is positive, then the IPO is 
considered as underpriced.   
                                              
5.2.2 Cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) 
 
To study the long term dynamics of IPOs, the cumulative average abnormal returns is 
used, as suggested Ritter (1991). The first step of CAR in this study is to calculate 
monthly benchmark-adjusted returns as the monthly raw return on an IPO stock (r it ) 
minus the benchmark returns (r mt ), so the first day adjusted return (ar i ) for issue i is 
defined as the percentage change in price from the offering date to the close at the first 
day of trading(r i ) less the equivalent change in an appropriate benchmark(r m ). 
 
(17)                                       ar i = r i - r m  
 
And then the benchmark adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as; 
 
(18)                                      ar it =r it -r mt  
 
The average benchmark adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t, is the 
equally-weighted arithmetic average of the benchmark-adjusted returns: 
 
     (19)                                      AR T =
n
1 n
i
itar
1
 
 
Then cumulative benchmark-adjusted aftermarket performance from event month q to 
event month s is the summation of the average equally-weighted benchmark-adjusted 
return: 
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   (20)                                     CAR sq , =
s
qt
TAR  
 
To test the statistically significance of abnormal returns for initial public offerings, 
Student‟s t-test is used. The t-statistics for the average adjusted return is computed for 
each month as AR T * tN /sd t , where AR T  is the average market-adjusted return for 
each month t, N T  is the number of observations in month t, and sd t  is the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t. 
 
The t-statistic for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, CAR t,1 , is computed 
as: 
 
    (21)                           t (CAR) =
cov*)1(2var*
*,
tt
NCAR ttI
 
 
Where N T  is the number of observations in month t, and t is the event month, var is the 
average (over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the AR t  series. 
 
5.2.3 Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
 
In this section, we will investigate the impact on investors‟ wealth if the same amount of 
money is invested passively in each IPO after the first day of trading compared with the 
buy-and-hold returns achieved by investing in the benchmark using windows over 1-day, 
3-days, and 1-month, 3-month, 6-month, 1-year, 2-year and 3-year periods. So the 
formula to calculate the T period buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) as the difference 
between the holding-period returns of IPO i and the benchmark return is following: 
 
      (22)                       BHAR Ti , =
T
t
tIR
1
, )1( - )1(
1
,
T
t
tBR  
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Where R ti ,  denotes the rate of return (including dividends and all other financial benefits 
stockholders receive) on stock i in month t after its IPO, and R tB,  is the corresponding 
benchmark return. The mean buy-and-hold abnormal return is computed as the arithmetic 
average of abnormal returns on all IPOs in the sample of size N: 
 
    (23)                             BHAR TIPO , =
N
1 N
i
TiBHAR
1
,  
 
A t-statistic is calculated based on the standard deviation of all firms‟ abnormal returns 
for an event window. T-statistics is adopted to test for the level of significance on the 
abnormal returns calculated by BHARs based on the market index. The conventional t-
statistic is defined as: 
 
(24)                                   t BHAR =
n
BHARP
/
PBHAR  
 
Where  is the sample average and  is the sample standard deviation of the 
BHARs of n firms. A negative (positive) value of BHAR indicates that IPOs 
underperform (outperform) a portfolio of benchmarks 
 
In this study the systematic risk was not explicitly adjusted when measuring the monthly 
abnormal returns. However, as mentioned in the paper (Levis 1993), the assumption of a 
positive market risk that beta equals to 1 does not affect the essence of the results and 
provide conservative estimates of IPOs‟ underperformance. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of analyses of the performance of IPOs on the main board 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in the three years following listing and the five hypotheses 
will be tested one by one. 
 
6.1 Initial performance of IPOs 
  
     H 1 : Initial public offerings are underpriced on the Hong Kong main board 
 
The first hypothesis tests whether the Hong Kong main board IPOs is underpriced based 
on the initial raw return and initial market adjusted return methodologies. The first day 
initial return is defined as the difference between the IPO‟ first day closing price and the 
offer price divided by the offer price and initial market adjusted return is calculated based 
on the Buy-and-hold methodology. 
 
6.1.1 Initial raw returns 
 
In the figure 7, the average initial raw return in this study is -6.7% during the sample 
period with an associated t-statistics of 3.26. The kurtosis of the distribution is 10.76 and 
the histogram is positively skewed, thus there are some extremely high negative returns 
and the mass distribution of initial raw returns is concentrated on the left side of 
coordinate origin. This phenomenon can also be proved also in the figure 8, which shows 
the most of initial raw returns of the 176 companies are negative. The initial raw returns of 
104 companies in total sample 176 companies are negative, however, there has still been a 
significant chances to gain profits in the first trading day since 37 percent of initial raw 
returns are positive.  
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Table 4 presents the results of initial raw returns by year.  We can see that the initial raw 
returns are significantly negative in the years 2000 and 2001 (-20% and -10%) with an 
associated t-statistics of 3.31 and 2.18 separately.  And one interesting phenomenon in 
year 2002 is the extremely high kurtosis with a value of 15.14.  This is partially due to the 
extremely high initial raw return of the company, Hon Po Group (Lobster King) Limited, 
which gain 155% return during the first listing day. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of All Initial Returns. 
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  Figure 8. The distribution of the initial raw returns for the 176 companies. 
 
Table 4. The distribution of the initial raw returns by year. 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mean -0.2 -0.1 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Median -0.19 -0.08 -0.06 0 -0.03 
Maximum 0.39 0.26 1.55 0.57 0.37 
Minimum -0.9 -0.61 -0.72 -1.12 -0.31 
Std.Dev 0.32 0.21 0.32 0.3 0.14 
Skewness -0.34 -0.6 2.53 -1.3 0.33 
Kurtosis 2.77 3.68 15.14 7.1 3.05 
t-statistics    -3.31** -2.18* -0.86 -0.62 -1.37 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
6.1.2 Market adjusted initial returns 
 
Table 5 presents the results from the equally weighted average initial returns based on the 
methodology of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the sample companies that 
went public during the period 2000 to 2004, using the market index as benchmark. 
Column one shows the results for all the sample companies and from column two to six, 
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-1
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0
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1
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2
0 50 100 150 200
Initial raw return
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the results of market adjusted returns in each year are presented. The main finding is that 
there is no evidence of underpricing in the initial public offering (IPO) stocks listed on the 
Hong Kong main board when using the market index benchmark. The average adjusted 
initial return is -7.36% with t-statistics -3.57. And the initial returns in year 2000 are the 
significantly lowest comparing to those in other sample years. 
 
Table 5. Market adjusted initial returns of IPOs. 
           All 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mean -0.07 -0.23 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
Median -0.07 -0.2 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 
S.D 0.27 0.31 0.2 0.31 0.29 0.31 
T-statistics  -3.57** -3.84** -2.14 -0.95 -0.64 -0.73 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
6.1.3 Conclusion of the initial performance of IPOs 
 
Based on both of the initial raw returns and initial market adjusted returns, the 
underpricing phenomenon does not exist on the main board of Hong Kong stock market 
during the years 2000 to 2004. And the initial returns are significantly negative in the 
years 2000 and 2001. Hong Kong main board IPOs were overpriced on average. These 
findings are in contract to those documented in the study (Loughran et al. 2006) where 
underprcing phenomenon is reported. 
 
This result is consistent with the Aggarwal, Leal & Hernandez (1996) found even during 
the “hot issue” season, there still exists the negative initial returns. And another 
explanation is that after the collapse of the Dot-Com boom during the year of 2000, 
investors had less enthusiasm to put their money in the IPO stocks even though the IPO 
firms on the main board are large, long established and sound. And the issuing firms 
overestimated the market sentiment for their firms‟ values. As a result, this led to the poor 
initial return of the IPO stocks compared to the overall market. So we reject the second 
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hypothesis in this study. 
 
6.2 The long term performance of IPOs 
 
In this section, the second hypothesis of long term performance of IPOs on the main 
board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange is studied based on the cumulative average market 
adjusted returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns methodologies. 
 
      H 2 : Post-IPO stocks underperform in the long-run on the Hong Kong Main Board 
 
6.2.1 Cumulative average market adjusted returns 
 
Table 6 reports the average market index-adjusted returns (AR T ) and cumulative average 
market index-adjusted returns (CAR sq , ) for the 36 months after the offering date for 188 
IPOs in 2000-2004. Column 4 reports the CARs calculated by equally-weighting, with 
the associated t statistics in Column 5. It is evident that all the 36 monthly average 
adjusted returns are negative, with 29 of them having t-statistics lower than -2.00. The 
negative average adjusted returns are reflected in a steady decline in the cumulative 
average adjusted returns, from -1.73% in the month 1 to -71.59% by the end of the month 
36, exclusive of the initial return, with an associated t-statistic of -9.28. Based on the 
equally-weighted CAR measure of long-run performance, the results of this study are in 
agreement with the results from the US reported by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter 
(1995), the UK results reported by Levis (1993) and Hong Kong results from Chan et al. 
(2007). So the underperformance of the IPOs is both economically and statistically 
significant. 
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Table 6. Abnormal Return for Initial Public Offerings in 2000-2004. 
 
Average market benchmark based on the market index adjusting returns (AR t ) and cumulative average 
returns (CAR t,1 ), with associated t-statistics for the 36 months after going public, excluding the initial 
return. AR T =
n
1 n
i
itar
1
, and ar it =r it -r mt , ar it  is the benchmark adjusted return for stock i in event 
month t. The t-statistics for the average adjusted return is computed for each month as AR T * tN /sd t , 
where AR T  is the average market-adjusted return for each month t, N T  is the number of observations in 
month t, and sd t  is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the adjusted returns for month t. The t-statistic 
Month of seasoning (%)  t-stat (%) t-statistics 
M1 -1.73 -1.25 -1.73 -1.36 
M2 1.17 1.04 -0.56 -0.31 
M3 -1.16 -1.07 -1.72 -0.77 
M4 -2.00 -1.72 -3.72 -1.45 
M5 -2.10 -1.92 -5.82 -2.03* 
M6 -0.47 -0.42 -6.30 -2.00* 
M7 4.16 2.07* -2.14 -0.63 
M8 -1.91 -1.45 -4.05 -1.11 
M9 -3.29 -1.94 -7.34 -1.90 
M10 -2.93 -2.67** -10.27 -2.53** 
M11 -2.11 -1.96 -12.38 -2.90** 
M12 -0.78 -0.66 -13.16 -2.96** 
M13 0.28 0.22 -12.88 -2.78** 
M14 -1.50 -1.10 -14.38 -2.99** 
M15 -4.21 -2.82** -18.59 -3.73** 
M16 -2.24 -1.83 -20.83 -4.05** 
M17 -2.01 -1.90 -22.85 -4.31** 
M18 -0.87 -0.89 -23.72 -4.35** 
M19 -3.61 -2.54* -27.33 -4.88** 
M20 -1.34 -1.22 -28.67 -4.99** 
M21 -2.77 -2.35* -31.44 -5.34** 
M22 -5.58 -4.00** -37.02 -6.14** 
M23 -4.67 -2.70** -41.69 -6.76** 
M24 -1.22 -1.17 -42.91 -6.81** 
M25 -2.69 -2.51* -45.60 -7.09** 
M26 -3.38 -2.71** -48.99 -7.47** 
M27 -1.30 -1.10 -50.29 -7.53** 
M28 -1.68 -1.59 -51.97 -7.64** 
M29 -3.58 -2.67** -55.55 -8.02** 
M30 -1.00 -0.93 -56.55 -8.03** 
M31 -2.82 -2.08* -59.37 -8.29** 
M32 -4.03 -3.00** -63.40 -8.72** 
M33 -2.30 -1.93 -65.71 -8.90** 
M34 -3.45 -2.79** -69.16 -9.22** 
M35 -2.11 -1.86 -71.27 -9.37** 
M36 -0.33 -0.26 -71.59 -9.28** 
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for the cumulative average adjusted return in month t, CAR t,1 , is computed as CAR t,1 * tN /csd t , 
where N
T
 is the number of observations in month t, and csd t is computed as csd t = [t*var+2*(t-1)*cov]
2/1
, where t is the event month, var is the average( over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the 
first-order autocovariance of the AR t  series.  
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
 
6.2.2 Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns 
 
Table 7 presents the results from the equally weighted mean one-, two- and three-year 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the sample companies that went public 
during the period 2000 to 2004, using the market index as benchmark. For investors who 
purchase the IPO stocks through the initial public offerings and sell the stocks in the last 
day after 36 month later, they would lose almost 40% on average. And the abnormal 
returns are more severe in the long horizons. The underperformance is statistically 
significant 1-3 years after the IPO. The 1-year, 2-year and 3-year BHARs are -9 percent, -
29 percent and -40 percent with t-statistics –2.17, -5.09 and -4.66, respectively. The 
results show suggest that there is evidence of long term underperformance for the IPOs 
on the Hong Kong main board which is consistent with earlier research. 
 
Table 7. The BHARs of Initial Public Offerings in 2000-2004. 
 
  Median Mean S.D T-statistics 
 
1-Month -0.04 -0.02 0.19 -1.81 
3-Month -0.06 -0.02 0.31 -0.89 
6-Month -0.06 -0.05 0.41 -1.81 
1-Year -0.11 -0.09 0.58 -2.17* 
2-Year -0.38 -0.29 0.79 -5.09** 
3-Year -1.02 -0.40 1.17 -4.66** 
 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
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6.2.3 Conclusion of long term performance of IPOs 
 
Using two methodologies to test the long term performance of IPOs on the main board of 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, we clearly accept the second hypothesis. Furthermore, 
comparing the return performance results based on CAR method and BHARs methods, 
we can find the underperformance of Hong Kong IPOs is much higher when CAR returns 
are used. This means that the BHARs method imparts an upward bias in the long term. 
This result is contrary to the expectation, which is the buy-and-hold return method can 
magnify underperformance, even if it occurs in only a single period (Fama (1998), 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) and Gompers & Lerner (2003)). 
 
6.3 The performance comparison between H-share IPOs and non H-
share IPOs 
 
The third and forth hypothesis shed light on the performance comparison between the H-
share companies and non H-share companies from the initial return and long term aspects.  
 
      H 3 : The performance of average initial returns is better with H-share stocks than non 
H-share stocks 
 
     H 4 : The average long-run performance is better with H-share stocks than non H-share 
stocks 
 
6.3.1 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
The main finding of Table 8 is that for the H-share IPO companies, the initial returns are 
higher than non H-share companies (-2% versus -8%). And in the three years 
anniversaries, the H-share companies outperform the overall market. However, the long 
term underperformance is statistically significant within the non H-share IPOs. The 
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BHARs are -9% for the first year, -32% for the two years and -47% for the three holding 
years with t-statistics -2.1, -5.37 and 5.75 individually. 
 
Table 8. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks spits the samples based on H-shares and 
Non H-shares. 
 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
6.3.2 Cumulative average adjusted returns  
 
To test the two hypotheses, the cumulative average adjusted returns methodology (CARs) 
will be also adopted. The main finding of Table 9 confirms the previous result: the 
performance of H-share after the initial public offering is better than the non H-share 
companies. In the third year period, the non H-share companies underperform 82% with 
the t statistics -8.99. 
 
Figure 9 plots the market index adjusted cumulative average returns based on the three 
groups where the initial returns are excluded: 1) all the sample companies, 2) H-share 
companies, 3) Non H-share companies. As the figure shows, while all the groups show 
display the negative long term performance, the H-share companies still perform much 
 
Initial 
returns 3-days 1-month 3-month 6-month 1-year 2-year 3-year 
 
Panel A: H-share companies       
         
median -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.22 
Mean -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.15 0.05 
S.D 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.23 0.30 0.46 0.64 1.33 
T-
Statistics -0.58 -0.37 0.37 0.72 -0.98 -1.02 -1.20 0.20 
         
Panel B: Non H-share companies       
         
median -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.46 -0.73 
Mean -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.32 -0.47 
S.D 0.28 0.29 0.20 0.33 0.43 0.59 0.81 1.13 
T-
Statistics -3.89** -3.60** -2.13* -1.23 -1.73 -2.10* -5.37** -5.75** 
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better than the non H-share IPOs. 
 
Table 9. The cumulative average adjusted returns of initial public offerings split into two 
groups: H-shares and Non H-shares in year 2000-2004. 
 
Month 
 
(H-share companies) t-statistics 
 
(Non H-share companies) t-statistics 
     
M1        0.00 -0.20 -0.02 -1.30 
M2  0.02  0.49 -0.01 -0.30 
M3 -0.01 -0.14 -0.02 -0.74 
M4 -0.05 -0.99 -0.04 -1.39 
M5 -0.09 -1.65 -0.06 -1.95 
M6 -0.09 -1.60 -0.06 -1.92 
M7 -0.08 -1.31 -0.01 -0.60 
M8 -0.12 -1.76 -0.03 -1.07 
M9 -0.13 -1.84 -0.07 -1.83 
M10 -0.16 -2.14* -0.09 -2.42* 
M11 -0.19 -2.34* -0.11 -2.79** 
M12 -0.18 -2.12* -0.13 -2.84** 
M13 -0.17 -1.91 -0.13 -2.67** 
M14 -0.13 -1.49 -0.15 -2.87** 
M15 -0.14 -1.50 -0.20 -3.58** 
M16 -0.12 -1.25 -0.22 -3.89** 
M17 -0.18 -1.77 -0.24 -4.14** 
M18 -0.18 -1.73 -0.25 -4.17** 
M19 -0.21 -1.99 -0.28 -4.68** 
M20 -0.19 -1.74 -0.30 -4.78** 
M21 -0.16 -1.44 -0.34 -5.12** 
M22 -0.17 -1.55 -0.40 -5.89** 
M23 -0.19 -1.64 -0.45 -6.49** 
M24 -0.18 -1.53 -0.47 -6.53** 
M25 -0.16 -1.33 -0.50 -6.80** 
M26 -0.14 -1.13 -0.54 -7.17** 
M27 -0.08 -0.60 -0.57 -7.22** 
M28 -0.03 -0.27 -0.60 -7.33** 
M29 -0.05 -0.36 -0.64 -7.70** 
M30 -0.03 -0.21 -0.65 -7.70** 
M31 -0.05 -0.39 -0.68 -7.95** 
M32 -0.06 -0.41 -0.73 -8.36** 
M33 -0.02 -0.16 -0.76 -8.53** 
M34 -0.01 -0.07 -0.80 -8.85** 
M35 -0.02 -0.15 -0.82 -8.99** 
M36 -0.03 -0.23 -0.82 -8.90** 
 
** and * represent significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
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Figure 9. Cumulative average market index adjusted returns for an equally-weighted 
portfolio of 188 initial public offerings in 2000-2004. Three series are plotted for the 36 
months after the IPOs date: 1) all the sample companies, 2) H-share companies, 3) Non H 
-share companies. 
 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion of performance comparison between H-share IPOs and 
non H-share IPOs 
 
Based on the Buy-and-hold returns and Cumulative adjusted returns methodologies, we 
can find the both initial returns and long term performance are better within the H-share 
companies than non H-share companies. So we clearly accept the third and fourth 
hypothesis.  
 
6.4 The comparison of IPOs performance between high issue season and 
low issue season 
 
The fifth hypothesis is relative to the theory of “window of opportunity” in the initial 
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public offerings based on the Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns methodology. 
 
         H 5 : Low long-run return for the stocks issued in the high volume period of IPOs 
 
From table 10 to table 14, the five tables report the performance of equally-weighted 
mean three-year BHARs for Hong Kong IPO companies listed during the years 2000 to 
2004, categorized by the year of listing. The poor long term abnormal performance 
statistically significantly occurred for IPOs taking place in the years 2002 and 2003 with 
the number of IPOs 51 and 43 separately. However, the long run underperformances 
occurring for IPOs taking place in the year 2000, 2001 and 2004 were not statistically 
significant. The negative relation between annual volume and aftermarket performance is 
evident, for instance, in the tables 11, 12 and 13. For example, the volume of new issues 
was double heavier in year 2003 than in 2001, and the three year holding market adjusted 
returns were significantly poorer for those IPOs issued in year 2003 than in 2001. The 
results are consisting with the finding of Loughran & Ritter (1995), they found that high 
underperformance existed in „hot issue‟ periods. And also confirms the results from Ritter 
(1991), he argues that this phenomenon reflects during some period of time, the investors 
are eager to pay high price for the initial public offering stocks because they were 
irrationally overoptimistic for the perspective of the growth opportunities and the firms 
timely choose to go public. As showed in the first chapter, the economic growth of Hong 
Kong was recovered from the year of 2002, so the investors were overoptimistic about 
the IPO companies and willing to pay high price for those stocks. These behaviors would 
lead to the poor long term performance of those IPO stocks. So we accept the fifth 
hypothesis in this study. 
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Table 10. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks in year of 2000 (IPOs: 30). 
 
 Median Mean S.D T-Stat 
Initial returns -0.20 -0.23 0.31 -3.84** 
3-days -0.19 -0.16 0.35 -2.36* 
1-month -0.10 -0.08 0.22 -1.98 
3-month -0.12 -0.04 0.38 -0.63 
6-month -0.11 -0.07 0.43 -0.90 
1-year -0.07 0.00 0.48 0.01 
2-year -0.03 0.00 0.61 0.04 
3-year -0.12 -0.07 0.60 -0.67 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
 
 
Table 11. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks in year of 2001 (IPOs : 21). 
 
 Median Mean S.D T-Stat 
Initial returns -0.08 -0.09 0.20 -2.14* 
3-days -0.09 -0.03 0.30 -0.53 
1-month -0.07 -0.05 0.15 -1.42 
3-month -0.01 0.10 0.42 1.07 
6-month 0.03 0.21 0.61 1.61 
1-year -0.07 -0.03 0.64 -0.18 
2-year -0.43 -0.22 0.74 -1.37 
3-year -0.66 -0.39 1.07 -1.66 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
 
 
Table 12. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks in year of 2002 (IPOs: 51). 
 
 Median Mean S.D T-Stat 
Initial returns -0.07 -0.04 0.31 -0.95 
3-days -0.08 -0.07 0.29 -1.53 
1-month -0.01 0.01 0.22 0.42 
3-month -0.01 0.00 0.27 0.00 
6-month -0.03 -0.04 0.34 -0.94 
1-year 0.02 0.01 0.61 0.15 
2-year -0.54 -0.43 0.70 -4.39** 
3-year -0.84 -0.61 0.97 -4.44** 
 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
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Table 13. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks in year of 2003 (IPOs: 43). 
 
 Median Mean S.D T-Stat 
Initial returns -0.01 -0.03 0.29 -0.64 
3-days -0.05 -0.05 0.30 -1.15 
1-month -0.03 -0.02 0.17 -0.88 
3-month -0.12 -0.10 0.31 -2.08* 
6-month -0.24 -0.17 0.43 -2.66* 
1-year -0.26 -0.33 0.56 -3.85** 
2-year -0.62 -0.58 0.82 -4.63** 
3-year -0.84 -0.70 1.21 -3.80** 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. BHARs of Initial Public Offering stocks in year of 2004 (IPOs: 43). 
 
 Median Mean S.D T-Stat 
Initial returns -0.04 -0.04 0.31 -0.73 
3-days -0.04 -0.05 0.35 -0.83 
1-month -0.03 -0.02 0.22 -0.62 
3-month -0.03 -0.01 0.38 -0.17 
6-month -0.04 -0.07 0.43 -1.01 
1-year -0.11 -0.07 0.48 -1.03 
2-year -0.19 -0.08 12.48 -0.04 
3-year -0.55 -0.09 24.48 -0.02 
 
** 1 percent level of statistical significance 
* 5 percent level of statistical significance 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigated the stock return performance of the IPO stocks which are listed 
on the main board of Hong Kong Stock Exchange during the years 2000 to 2004 based on 
the cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) and buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs) 
methodologies. 
 
For a sample of firms going public between the period January 2000 to November 2004, 
for an investor who subscribed to the IPO stocks and sold the stocks on the first-trading 
day, the average market adjusted initial returns was -7.36 percent. As a result of the 
above, underpricing phenomenon is not observed on the main board of Hong Kong stock 
market during that period of time. The Hong Kong main board IPO stocks were 
overpriced on average. This result appears to be the major difference between the short-
run behavior of the main board Hong Kong IPOs and previous international evidence. 
This phenomenon may be explained by the effect of the collapse of the Dot-Com boom 
from the year 2000. This indicates that investors had less enthusiasm to put their money 
in the IPO stocks even though the IPO firms on the main board were large, long 
established and sound. At the same time, during the less enthusiasm by investors, the 
issuing firms still overestimated the market sentiment for their firms‟ values. As a result, 
this led to the poor initial return of the IPO stocks.  
 
During the years 2000 to 2004, an investor who invested in IPOs at the end of the first 
day of public trading and held them for 3 years would gain almost 72% and 40% less 
based on the cumulative market adjusted average return methodology and the hold-and-
buy methodology respectively than investing in the Hang Seng index with the same 
amount of money. This result confirms the long term underperformance of IPOs in the 
previous studies. (see e.g. Ritter (1998), Cheng et al. (2004) & Chan (2007))  
 
Furthermore, compared the return performance results based on CARs method and 
BHARs methods, the underperformance of Hong Kong IPOs is much higher when CARs 
returns are used. This means that the BHARs method imparts an upward bias in the long-
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run. This result is contrary to the expectation, which is the buy-and-hold return method 
can magnify underperformance, even if it occurs in only a single period (Fama (1998), 
Mitchell & Stafford (2000) and Gompers & Lerner (2003)). 
 
By splitting the samples based on the H-share IPOs and non H-share IPOs, poor 
aftermarket performance exists in both groups. While the performance is comparatively 
better in the H-share group than in the non H-share group. This result can be derived from 
the stronger economic growth rate on the mainland China than in Hong Kong from the 
beginning of last decade of 20
th
 century. 
 
When investigating the aftermarket performance categorized by the year of issuance, we 
find poorer long term performance associated with the heavy volume of IPO in certain 
years and this result proves that the issuing firms are taking advantage of “windows of 
opportunity”. 
 
 Further research should be conducted focusing on the aftermarket performance based on 
the matching firms and the intra-day data to investigate the microstructure effects of IPOs. 
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8. APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. Initial Listing Fees (Handbook: Listing In Hong Kong). 
 
Monetary Value of Equity Securities to be listed (HK$ Million) Initial Listing Fee(HK$) 
Not exceeding 
100 
 
150,000 
200 175,000 
300 200,000 
400 225,000 
500 250,000 
750 300,000 
1,000 350,000 
1,500 4000,000 
2,000 450,000 
2,500 500,000 
3,000 550,000 
4,000 600,000 
5,000 600,000 
Over 5,000 650,000 
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Appendix 2. Annual Listing Fees (Handbook: Listing In Hong Kong). 
 
Nominal Value of Listing Equity Securities 
(HK$ Million) Annual Listing Fee (HK$) 
Not exceeding 
200 
 
145,000 
300 172,000 
400 198,000 
500 224,000 
750 290,000 
1,000 356,000 
1,500 449,000 
2,000 541,000 
2,500 634,000 
3,000 726,000 
4,000 898,000 
5,000 1,069,000 
Over 5,000 1,188,000 
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Appendix 3. Main financial requirement for listing on the Main Board of Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. 
 
 1. Profit Test 2. Market Cap/ 
Revenue Test 
3. Market Cap/ 
Revenue/Cashflow 
Test 
Profit Attributable 
to Shareholders 
Profits of HK$50 million 
in the last 3 years (with 
HK$20 million in the 
most recent year and 
an aggregate of HK$30 
million in the two 
preceding years) 
N/A N/A 
Market Cap At least HK$200 million 
at the time of listing 
At least HK$4 billion at 
the time of listing 
At least HK$4 billion at 
the time of listing 
Revenue N/A At least HK$500 million 
for the most recent 
audited financial year 
At least HK$500 million 
for the most recent 
audited financial year 
Cash flow N/A N/A Positive cashflow from 
operating activities of 
at least HK$100 million 
in aggregate for the 
t h ree pre c e d i n g 
financial years 
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Appendix 4. Data sample used in this study. 
 
   IPO YEAR 
 
STOCK CODE 
 
COMPANY NAME 
 
2000 768 UBA Investments Ltd 
2000 692 Ching Hing (Holdings) Ltd 
2000 694 Beijing Capital International Airport Co Ltd - H Shares 
2000 969 Hua Lien International (Holding) Co Ltd 
2000 997 Decca Holdings Ltd 
2000 643 Carry Wealth Holdings Ltd 
2000 866 Sunday Communications Ltd 
2000 857 PetroChina Co Ltd - H Share 
2000 751 Skyworth Digital Holdings Ltd 
2000 927 Fujikon Industrial Holdings Ltd 
2000 599 E. Bon Holdings Ltd 
2000 686 Gay Giano International Group Ltd 
2000 859 Zida Computer Technologies Ltd 
2000 762 China Unicom Ltd 
2000 388 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd 
2000 966 China Insurance International Holdings Co Ltd 
2000 111 Hantec Investment Holdings Ltd 
2000 7 Karl Thomson Holdings Ltd 
2000 188 SW Kingsway Capital Holdings Ltd 
2000 66 MTR Corporation Ltd 
2000 365 Sun East Technology (Holdings) Ltd 
2000 335 Upbest Group Ltd 
2000 386 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation - H Shares 
2000 162 I-Wood International Holdings Ltd 
2000 627 U-RIGHT International Holdings Ltd 
2000 192 Saint Honore Holdings Ltd 
2000 678 Star Cruises Ltd 
2000 1100 Mainland Headwear Holdings Ltd 
2000 682 Chaoda Modern Argiculture (Holdings) Ltd 
2000 274 Global Green Tech Group Ltd 
2000 361 Sino Golf Holdings Ltd 
2001 39 Wealthmark International (Holdings) Ltd 
2001 696 Travelsky Technology Ltd 
2001 809 Global Bio-chem Technology Group Co Ltd 
2001 1213 Mobicon Group Ltd 
2001 329 Golden Dragon Group (Holdings) Ltd 
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2001 861 Digital China Holdings Ltd 
2001 889 Datronix Holdings Ltd 
2001 888 RoadShow Holdings Ltd 
2001 885 Forefront International Holdings Ltd 
2001 9 Mandarin Entertainment (Holdings) Ltd 
2001 1228 Tak Shun Technology Group ltd 
2001 931 Artel Solutions Group Holdings Ltd 
2001 909 Zhongda International Holdings Ltd 
2001 248 HKC International Holdings Ltd 
2001 690 New Spring Holdings Ltd 
2001 629 Yue Da Holdings Ltd 
2001 197 Heng Tai Consumables Group Ltd 
2001 2668 Pak Tak International Ltd 
2001 739 Zhekiang Glass Co Ltd- H Shares 
2001 2600 Aluminium Corporation of China Ltd- H Shares 
2001 100 Clear Media Ltd 
2002 896 Hanison Construction Holdings Ltd 
2002 1073 China Agrotech Holdings Ltd 
2002 746 Lee & Man Handbag International Ltd 
2002 1129 Sky Hawk computer Group Holdings Ltd 
2002 812 Tanrich Financial Holdings Ltd 
2002 1126 Dream International Ltd 
2002 1002 V.S. International Group Ltd 
2002 1076 First National Foods Holdings Ltd 
2002 130 Moiselle International Holdings Ltd 
2002 228 Hon Po Group (Lobster King) Ltd 
2002 209 Sewco International Holdings Ltd 
2002 1161 Water Oasis Group Ltd 
2002 916 Fu Cheong International Holdings Ltd 
2002 157 Natural Beauty Bio-Technology Ltd 
2002 646 Yardway Group Ltd 
2002 1186 Value Partners China Greenchip Fund Ltd 
2002 223 Kenfair International (Holdings) Ltd 
2002 2389 Wang Sing International Holdings Group Ltd 
2002 928 Tack Fat Group International Ltd 
2002 582 Greenfield Chemical Holdings Ltd 
2002 856 VST Holdings Ltd 
2002 915 Linmark Group Ltd 
2002 1198 Chitaly Holdings Ltd 
2002 766 Sino Prosper Holdings Ltd 
2002 2688 Xinao Gas Holdings Ltd 
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2002 169 China Fair Land Holdings Ltd 
2002 64 Get Nice Holdings Ltd 
2002 356 Incutech Investments Ltd 
2002 2323 Topsearch International (Holdings) Ltd 
2002 1094 Sunny Global Holdings Ltd 
2002 628 Teem Foundation Group Ltd 
2002 2388 BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd 
2002 1211 BYD Co Ltd - H Shares 
2002 1217 Sino Technology Investments Co Ltd 
2002 364 Huafeng Environmental Protection  Group Ltd 
2002 860 Ming Fung Jewellery Group Ltd 
2002 2898 Long Far Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd 
2002 912 Suga International Holdings Ltd 
2002 1227 First Asia Capital Investment Ltd 
2002 395 Asia Zirconium Ltd 
2002 2888 Standard Chartered PLC 
2002 221 LeRoi Holdings Ltd 
2002 1142 Rontex International Holdings Ltd 
2002 2309 Grandtop International Holdings Ltd 
2002 850 Wing Shing Chemical Holdings Ltd 
2002 379 PME Group Ltd 
2002 728 China Telecom Corporation Ltd - H Shares 
2002 357 Hainan Meilan Airport Co Ltd - H Shares 
2002 2883 China Oilfield Services Ltd - H Shares 
2002 587 Hua Han Bio-Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd 
2002 607 Warderly International Holdings Ltd 
2003 2302 United Metals Holdings Ltd 
2003 1195 Sinotronics Holdings Ltd 
2003 2330 Techwayson Holdings Ltd 
2003 1178 Vitop Bioenergy Holdings Ltd 
2003 598 Sinotrans Ltd - H Shares 
2003 2326 BEP International Holdings Ltd 
2003 2336 Sunlink International Holdings Ltd 
2003 264 Chanco International Group Ltd 
2003 1140 Concepta Investments Ltd 
2003 2322 Sam Woo Holdings Ltd 
2003 2868 Beijing Capital Land Ltd - H Shares 
2003 2349 Wah Yuen Holdings Ltd 
2003 2317 Vedan International (Holdings) Ltd 
2003 980 Lianhua Supermarket Holdings Co., Ltd - H Shares 
2003 2355 Baoye Group Co Ltd - H Shares 
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2003 2882 Ocean Grand Chemicals Holdings Ltd 
2003 572 Spread Prospects Holdings Ltd 
2003 2310 Kwang Sung Electronics HK Co Ltd 
2003 387 Leeport (Holdings) Ltd 
2003 2348 Dawnrays Pharmaceutical (Holdings) Ltd 
2003 2342 Comba Telecom Systems Holdings Ltd 
2003 653 Bonjour Holdings Ltd 
2003 309 Lo's Enviro-pro Holdings Ltd 
2003 1164 Vital BioTech Holdings Ltd 
2003 737 Hopewell Highway Infrastructure Ltd 
2003 2368 Eagle Nice (International) Holdings Ltd 
2003 565 Art Textile Technology International Co Ltd 
2003 2320 Hop Fung Group Holdings Ltd 
2003 2698 Weiqiao Textile Co Ltd - H Shares 
2003 2314 Lee & Man Paper Manufacturing Ltd 
2003 2340 Synergis Holdings Ltd 
2003 2339 Norstar Founders Group Ltd 
2003 2327 Jiwa Bio-Pharm Holdings Ltd 
2003 2324 China Northern Enterprises Investment Fund Ltd 
2003 2357 AviChina Industry & Technology Co Ltd - H Shares 
2003 589 Ports Design Ltd 
2003 2328 PICC Property and Casualty Co Ltd - H Shares 
2003 836 China Resources Power Holdings Co Ltd 
2003 1149 Broad Intelligence Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd 
2003 699 Chia Hsin Cement Greater China Holding Corporation 
2003 2333 Great Wall Automobile Company Ltd- H Shares 
2003 2628 China Life Insurance Company Ltd- H Shares 
2003 2899 Fujian Zijin Mining Industry Co Ltd - H Shares 
2004 904 China Green Holdings Ltd 
2004 110 Fortune Telecom Holdings Ltd 
2004 2337 Shanghai Forte Land Co Ltd - H Shares 
2004 581 China Oriental Group Co Ltd 
2004 2341 EcoGreen Fine Chemicals Group Ltd 
2004 2338 Weichai Power Co Ltd - H Shares 
2004 981 Semiconductor Manufacturing International Co Ltd 
2004 2300 Vision Grande Group Holdings Ltd 
2004 1160 Grand Investment International Ltd 
2004 2878 Solomon Systech (International) Ltd 
2004 77 AMS Public Transport Holdings Ltd 
2004 2633 Nam Tai Electronic & Electrical Products Ltd 
2004 2319 China Mengniu Dairy Co Ltd 
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2004 2866 China Shipping Container Lines Co Ltd - H Shares 
2004 700 Tencent Holdings Ltd 
2004 1116 Mayer Holdings Ltd 
2004 2318 Ping An Insurance Co. of China, Ltd - H Shares 
2004 2331 Li Ning Company Ltd 
2004 2356 Dah Sing Banking Group Ltd 
2004 2366 Qin Jia Yuan Media Services Co Ltd 
2004 2343 Pacific Basin Shipping Ltd 
2004 733 Hopefluent Group Holdings Ltd 
2004 311 Luen Thai Holdings Ltd 
2004 2358 Mitsumaru East Kit (Holdings) Ltd 
2004 2383 TOM Group Ltd 
2004 597 CSMC Technologies Corporation 
2004 2379 Zhongtian International Ltd 
2004 2307 Kam Hing International Holdings Ltd 
2004 2618 TCL Communication Technology Holdings Ltd 
2004 1194 China Force Oil & Grains Industrial Holdings Co., Ltd 
2004 745 Wing Hong (Holdings) Ltd 
2004 2380 China Power International Development Ltd 
2004 2332 Hutchison Telecommunications International Ltd 
2004 929 IPE Group Ltd 
2004 906 China Netcom Group Co. (Hong Kong) Limited  
2004 2371 ZZNode Holdings Company Limited 
2004 2877 China Shineway Pharmaceutical Group Limited 
2004 2387 Integrated Distribution Services Group Limited 
2004 2369 China Wireless Technologies Limited 
2004 2678 Texhong Textile Group Limited  
2004 763 ZTE Corporation - H Shares 
2004 753 Air China Limited - H Shares 
2004 1175 FU JI Food and Catering Services Holdings Limited 
2004 438 IRICO Group Electronics Company Limited - H Shares 
2004 1000 Beijing Media Corporation Limited - H Shares 
2004 319 China Metal International Holdings Inc 
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